Морально-психологическое обеспечения армии США

In general, the operation "Iraqi Freedom" once again demonstrated that little attention was paid to the issues of maintaining the psychological stability of US and British military personnel before the outbreak of hostilities, on the battlefield and after returning from combat operations. When planning and during the individual stages of military operations, it was necessary to take in-to account the theoretical developments, conclusions and practical recommen-dations of military psychologists and psychiatrists, which would ultimately contribute both to the resolution of issues of moral and psychological readi-ness of troops to participate in various conflicts, and to the successful achievement of ultimate goals and the tasks of the military operation.
The US military-political leadership considers the maintenance of the moral and psychological state (MPS) of personnel of the armed forces as one of the priority areas in the sphere of ensuring national security. This is due to the desire of the country's VRP to reduce the influence of negative factors on the mental and emotional state of servicemen and thereby increase their readi-ness to perform combat missions.
In the US Department of Defense, moral and psychological training and strong-willed qualities of personnel are considered as the basis for modern and future military operations. This is because, despite the use of high-tech weap-ons, the successful outcome of modern combat still largely depends on the be-havior of the soldier and his psychological attitude. The study of the relevant characteristics of personnel has always been an important direction in the ac-tivities of commanders of the armed forces of all degrees.
In general, the Pentagon recognizes that the moral and psychological state of American military personnel can not be called high. The main reason for the negative trends is the large-scale and long-term involvement of the US Armed Forces in various conflicts and missions with a high level of risk for life far from the national territory. Business trips to "hot spots" cause stresses, depressions and other nervous disorders both among servicemen themselves and among their families.
One of the key indicators of low MEA in the American army is a high su-icide rate among military personnel. Until 2012, their number has steadily in-creased, especially in the units of the ground forces, reaching in some periods 20% of the total number of losses. The main reason for this was the incursions of national armed forces into Iraq and Afghanistan.
The peak of suicide occurred in 2012, when the number of servicemen who committed them, according to various estimates, exceeded 350 people. Against the backdrop of relative stabilization of the situation in the Middle East in 2013-2014, the number of suicides in the Air Force has increased. It is believed that this was due to a significant reduction in military presence in the Middle East and Afghanistan, as the US Air Force intensified its use of con-flicts in northern Africa and air strikes against the positions of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (IGIL) terrorist group on Iraq's terri- tory Syria.
Proceeding from this, the leadership of the United States Defense Minis-try devotes special attention to the development of measures to prevent sui-cides among servicemen. The fundamental document in this area is the "Na-tional Strategy for the Activities of Federal Ministries and Offices for Suicide Prevention" (2008), according to which the inter-agency department for the prevention of suicide and risk reduction is responsible for coordinating such activities. They are led by the US Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health and Mobilization.
In addition, special bodies responsible for carrying out measures to pre-vent suicides among servicemen have been created within each of the armed forces. The fight against this phenomenon is the prerogative of not only the above-mentioned organizations, but the entire command structure of the US Armed Forces.
In the troops, the responsibility for this work is assigned to unit com-manders, military priests (chaplains) and psychologists from medical services. They inform the military leadership about the state of servicemen, including during the fighting.
Thus, during operations involving US military units, when the report of specialists about their "psychological exhaustion", the command took steps to "restore morale," even if it was necessary to suspend the offensive. Independ-ent experts believe that at that time a regrouping of forces, replacement of par-tially demoralized units, as well as psychological rehabilitation activities were carried out.
Provision of qualified assistance to servicemen who received psychologi-cal trauma is an important and necessary component of the moral and psycho-logical support for combat operations of troops. Violation of mental balance not only harms the health of personnel and reduces its combat capability, but in some cases it takes considerable time to restore psycho-physiological func-tions. Thus, those who received military injuries in Afghanistan after leaving hospital for rehabilitation took two to three months, and those who witnessed the death of their comrades, were able to restore their professional skills only after three to five years.
American experts believe that in order to avoid the possibility of occur-rence of psychotraumatic situations in the armed forces, it is necessary to take preventive complex measures that require large material costs, social and polit-ical support. However, not everyone believes that this will lead to positive re-sults. According to some statistics, fewer officers believe that the Pentagon is able to offer the right way out of the current situation.
Having studied the existing experience and based on the latest develop-ments and conclusions of specialists, the leadership of the United States De-partment of Defense in the course of preparing military operations in 2008 de-cided to include special units in the combat units where psychiatrists and psy-chologists would be included so that they could react in a timely manner to the emerging problems of the moral and psychological plan and to return service-men as soon as possible.
For example, the organizational and staff structure of the psychological support agencies for the coalition forces' personnel in Iraq included so-called stress control departments (within the framework of the 5 AK commands and 18 DCC US Army). In addition, each division had at least three full-time spe-cialists: a psychiatrist, a psychologist and his assistant. The identification of servicemen who were exposed to the impact of combat stress and the provi-sion of their first psychological assistance were assigned directly to the com-manders of units and subunits.
Another problem of the American army is the fact of the presence in its